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Using a Shotgun to Kill a Fly: Issues with the CFPB’s
Payday Lending Proposal and the Need to Incentivize
Banks to Enter the Marketplace
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit is a vital mechanism for consumers living paycheck to
paycheck coping with shortfalls in income.1 Such shortfalls can arise
from numerous situations, including unexpected expenses, emergencies,
and mismatched timing between income and expenses.2 Borrowing
against future income is a common practice, and payday lenders serve
consumers lacking the income necessary to adequately cover financial
needs.3
Payday lenders are “central figures in the fringe banking
industry.”4 The payday lending industry has more locations than
McDonald’s,5 extends over $38 billion in credit per year to individuals
in 19 million households, employs over 50,000 workers, and generates
over $2.5 billion annually in tax revenue.6 Supporters of payday
lending praise both the speed at which payday loans can be executed as
well as the availability of payday loans to those unqualified for
alternative forms of credit.7 On the other hand, opponents of payday
lending are concerned with borrowers’ ability to repay payday loans on
time while also covering basic living expenses, in addition to the

1. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,866 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
2. Id.
3. Creola Johnson, Payday Lending: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002).
4. Id. at 8.
5. Jeff Cox, There are More Payday Lenders in U.S. Than McDonald’s, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/there-are-more-paydaylenders-u-s-mcdonalds-n255156.
6. About the Payday Advance Industry, CMTY. FIN. SERVICES ASS’N OF AM., http://
cfsaa.com/about-the-payday-advance-industry.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
7. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS:
A WHITE PAPER OF INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 3 (2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf.

328

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

aggressive debt collection practices payday lenders employ.8
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”)
proposed rule on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost
Installment Loans (the “Proposal”) aims to regulate, among other types
of financing, payday loans.9 As of October 2016, the CFPB had
received close to one million comments regarding the Proposal, far
more than any other proposal in the agency’s history.10 This Note
proceeds in six Parts. Part II examines the operation of payday loans
and outlines several of the major consequences borrowers face when
taking out such loans.11 Part III describes the Proposal and the
requirements it imposes on lenders.12 Part IV analyzes the Proposal in
light of its goals of eliminating predatory lending practices and
providing consumers with safe access to credit.13 Part V discusses how
regulators can incentivize traditional banks to enter the payday loan
marketplace, whether through modifications to the Proposal or other
mechanisms.14 Part VI concludes this Note by summarizing the
Proposal’s deficiencies and banks’ abilities to replace payday lenders.15
II. THE BUSINESS OF PAYDAY LENDING
Payday loans are easy to acquire, and payday lenders
infrequently perform due diligence in determining whether a borrower
will be able to repay a loan on time.16 As a result, significant numbers
of unqualified borrowers take out payday loans they are unable to repay
on time, leading borrowers to extend their loans and eventually become

Id.
Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,867 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (“This
rulemaking is focused on . . . short-term loans. The largest category of short-term loans are
“payday loans,” . . . and short-term vehicle title loans . . . .”).
10. Yuka Hayashi, Rachel Witkowski & Gabriel Rubin, Dueling Payday-Lending
Campaigns Deluge CFPB With Comments, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2016), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/dueling-payday-lending-campaigns-deluge-cfpb-with-comments1476131725?mg=id-wsj.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 10 (listing the few requirements of applying for a
payday loan).
8.
9.
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trapped in a cycle of debt.17 Further, payday lenders have a history of
targeting low-income individuals and engaging in aggressive and
predatory debt collection practices.18 This Part discusses how payday
loans operate and outlines some of the major consequences to
borrowers, including the debt cycle borrowers often fall into, aggressive
debt collection practices, and attempted regulation of payday lending at
the state level.
A.

The Operation of Payday Loans

Payday loans are short-term, high-cost loans where a borrower
provides a post-dated check or access to a debit account in exchange for
immediate cash.19 Applying for a payday loan is a simple process that
contains only a few requirements.20 Unlike more traditional loans,
payday lenders do not require collateral, consider the borrower’s other
financial obligations, or check the borrower’s credit score.21 Borrowers
simply promise to repay the principal in full plus a fee.22 The fee
accompanying a payday loan is generally 10–20% of the principal
borrowed,23 which can lead to an annual percentage rate (“APR”) as
high as 400%.24
A dangerous feature of payday lending is the ability of
borrowers to extend loans,25 increasing the costs of borrowing and
17. Id. at 3–4.
18. See id. at 11 (noting that payday lenders serve a class of borrowers with low

incomes and no savings and do not accept partial payments for repaying loans).
19. Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Reputable” Banks End Cycles of Debt?,
42 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 660 (2008).
20. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 8 (highlighting the ease at
which consumers can acquire a payday loan).
21. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,872 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041); CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 9. But see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-401 (West
2016) (requiring lenders to ensure the borrower has the ability to repay the loan); MO. REV.
STAT. § 408.500(7) (2015) (requiring lenders to consider a borrower’s ability to repay the
loan, but does not specify how a lender may satisfy this requirement); WIS. STAT. § 138.14
(2016) (prohibiting loans exceeding a certain percentage of a borrower’s gross monthly
income).
22. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47869.
23. This amounts to $10 to $20 per $100 borrowed. Id. at 47867.
24. Id. at 47,868.
25. Patrick Hayes, A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lending
Practices and Promoting Lower Cost Alternatives, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1134, 1142
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creating the “debt cycle” trap that the Proposal aims to eliminate.26 If a
borrower is unable to repay a payday loan when it is due, he may pay an
additional fee to “roll-over” the loan to extend the due date.27 The rollover fee is usually equal to the initial fee to receive the loan.28 A
borrower remains indebted until he repays the principal plus any costs
and interest.29 Lenders typically refuse to accept partial payments for
the principal, forcing borrowers to extend loans until they can repay the
entire balance in one payment.30 The roll-over process can trap the
borrower in a cycle of debt, with the borrower repeatedly extending a
loan and incurring additional fees and the lender content to keep the
principal unpaid.31 The danger of the roll-over feature is displayed in a
study conducted by the Center for Responsible Lending (“CRL”), which
found that although borrowers had an average loan amount of only
$350, borrowers in the study paid a median total of $458 in fees and one
in four borrowers paid at least $781 in fees.32
Supporters and opponents of payday lending both acknowledge
that repeat borrowers are critical to the payday lending business
model.33 Dan Feehan, former CEO of payday lender Cash America,
once stated that “the theory in the business is you’ve got to get that
customer in, work to turn him into a repetitive customer, long-term
customer, because that’s really where the profit is.”34 Payday lenders
employ a variety of techniques to encourage repeat borrowing.35 Some
lenders instruct employees to pressure customers into borrowing more,36
(2009).
26.

Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at

47,926.
Kenneth, supra note 19, at 660.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 10–11.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 11
Kenneth, supra note 19, at 660.
Heather L. Petrovich, Circumventing State Consumer Protection Laws: Tribal
Immunity and Internet Payday Lending, 91 N.C. L. REV. 326, 331 (2012).
32. Thomas Edsall, Making Money Off the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013, 10:48
PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/making-money-off-the-poor/?_r=0.
33. See, e.g., Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest – Good While Supplies Last: A Study of
Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 573 (2010); Payday, Vehicle
Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,863, 47,874 (proposed July
22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (noting that payday lending is “dependent
upon a large volume of reborrowing”).
34. Edsall, supra note 32.
35. Martin, supra note 33, at 573.
36. Martin, supra note 33, at 575.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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while others provide monetary incentives rewarding employees and
store managers for loan volumes.37 One participant in a study claimed
that if a customer paid off the interest on time five times in a row, the
customer would receive the sixth interest payment at half price.38 The
combination of low-income borrowers’ desperate need for credit and
payday lenders propensity to encourage repeat borrowing creates a
dangerous treadmill of debt, often leaving struggling borrowers worse
off than they were prior to receiving a payday loan.39
B.

Predatory Lending Practices and State Regulatory Reponses

Payday lenders have a history of targeting low-income
individuals.40 Payday loan borrowers typically have incomes in the
range of $25,000–$30,000, poor credit histories, and have often
repeatedly sought credit in the months leading up to the decision to take
out a payday loan.41 Additionally, borrowers have often filed for
bankruptcy either before or after taking out a payday loan.42 Payday
lenders often utilize “coercive techniques to intimidate consumers to
collect debts,”43 in addition to generally harmful and harassing
conduct.44 At the time of the Proposal’s release, the CFPB had received
approximately 24,000 consumer complaints related to payday loan debt
collection practices.45
States have prioritized the regulation of payday lending to
37.

Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at

47,873.
Martin, supra note 33, at 573.
Edsall, supra note 32.
LAUREN SAUNDERS, LEAH PLUNKETT & CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L.
CTR., STOPPING THE PAYDAY LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT WORK, ONES THAT DON’T 4
(2010), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/reportstopping-payday-trap.pdf (noting that payday lenders use specialized credit reporting
services to track the subprime market).
41. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,920 (claiming that nearly one in five consumers using payday loans receive some form of
public assistance or other benefits as a source of income). One study conducted by the
Center for Responsible Lending suggests that the median annual income of a borrower is as
low as $22,476. Edsall, supra note 32.
42. See Martin, supra note 33, at 575 (citing a study revealing that as many as 10% of
individuals who declared bankruptcy listed taking out more than one payday loan).
43. Hayes, supra note 25, at 1143.
44. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,930.
45. Id. at 47,898.
38.
39.
40.
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combat these predatory lending practices.46 Many states set limits on
payday loan amounts, ranging from $300 to $1,000.47 Others limit the
amount of a payday loan to the lesser of a percentage of the borrower’s
income or a fixed dollar amount.48 Only two states, Nevada and
Wyoming, are silent as to the maximum payday loan amount
permitted.49 Some states set a maximum amount for fees, with 15%, or
$15 per $100, of the amount borrowed being the most common limit.50
Michigan limits transactions to $600 and prohibits payday
lending to consumers who already have more than one open transaction
with another licensed lender.51 Fees are capped at 15% on the first $100
borrowed, 14% on the second $100, and eventually decline to 11% on
the fifth and sixth $100.52 Arbitration can be required only if the lender
agrees to cover all of the expenses relating to arbitration.53 In addition,
Michigan created a private right of action for any “person injured by a
licensee’s violation” of its Deferred Presentment Services Transactions
46. For more information on state statutes regulating payday lending, visit Payday
Lending State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/financial-services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx.
Georgia
even declared that “the site or location of a place of business where payday lending takes
place . . . is . . . a public nuisance.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-8 (2016).
47. At least nineteen States cap payday loan amounts at $500 or $600 (Alabama,
Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Virginia), while California limits payday loans to $300, and Delaware caps
payday loans at $1,000. See ALA. CODE § 5-18A-12(a) (2016); ALASKA STAT. § 06.50.410
(2016); CAL. FIN. CODE § 23035(a) (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 2227(7) (2016);
FLA. STAT. § 560.404(5) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480F-4(c) (2016); IOWA CODE §
533D.10(1)(b) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-4-4(1)(c) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
286.9-100(9) (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2153(1) (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. §
75-67-519(2) (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 408.500(1) (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-919(1)(b)
(2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(3) (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.39(A) (West
2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 3106(7) (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-14.4-5.1(a) (2016); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 34-39-180(B) (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-4-66 (2016); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 45-17-112(o) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1816(5) (2016).
48. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-413(1)–(2) (2016) (limiting a payday loan amount to
the lesser of 25% of a borrower’s income or $1,000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(e)
(2016) (limiting payday loan amount to the lesser of 25% of a borrower’s income or
$1,000); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7-402, 404 (2016) (20% or $550); WASH. REV. CODE §
31.45.073(2) (2016) (30% or $700); WIS. STAT. § 138.14(12)(b) (2016) (35% or $1,000).
49. NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.425(1)(b) (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-363 (2016).
50. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,869 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
51. Jopel Shih, Payday Lending: A Thin Line Between Love and Hate, 3 FAULKNER L.
REV. 37, 58 (2011).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Act, which includes a right to recover attorney’s fees.54
New Mexico once relied on small-loan legislation to regulate
payday loans, but the absence of a dedicated payday-lending statute left
a void in regulation.55 Eventually, New Mexico capped payday loan
fees at $15.50 per $100 borrowed.56 Payday lenders must offer an
automatic 130-day, no-cost payment plan, as well as limit outstanding
loans to 25% of a borrower’s gross monthly income.57
North Carolina prohibits payday lending.58 However, online
payday lenders based overseas or on Indian reservations continue to
make payday loans by taking advantage of a legal principle called
Tribal Sovereign Immunity; in referencing this principle, payday
lenders claim they are not subject to North Carolina laws, a common
practice among payday lenders throughout the U.S.59 Additionally,
payday lenders contract with “federally chartered banks . . . to take
advantage of federal banking laws that allow such banks to make loans
across state lines without regard to that state’s interest [rate limits] in
‘rent-a-charter’ or ‘rent-a-bank’ contracts.”60 Despite increased state
regulation, the payday loan industry regularly finds and abuses
loopholes in almost every state law passed.61 Overall, the CFPB argues
that the Proposal is necessary to adequately protect consumers because
state regulations have not been able to substantially reduce rates of

54. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2165 (2016).
55. Shih, supra note 51, at 58.
56. Megan Kamerick, Compromise Reached on Proposed Payday Lending Reforms,

ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (Feb. 13, 2007, 7:30 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
albuquerque/stories/2007/02/12/daily15.html.
57. Id.
58. Payday Loans, N.C. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.ncdoj.gov/Consumer/Creditand-Debt/Payday-Loans.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
59. Id. For more information on payday lenders using Tribal Sovereign Immunity to
evade state regulation, see generally Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance
Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer
Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 751 (2012).
60. Ga. Cash Am., Inc. v. Greene, 318 Ga. App. 355, 359 (2012).
61. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 33, at 578–95; Creola Johnson, America’s First
Consumer Financial Watchdog is on a Leash: Can the CFPB Use Its Authority to Declare
Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 381, 399–401
(2012) (noting how payday lenders use Native American tribal immunity to circumvent state
regulations); William Isaac, Why Payday Loans are Good for Millions of People, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-payday-loansare-good-for-millions-of-people-1061280-1.html (“Some online lenders avoid regulation by
setting up operations offshore or on an Indian reservations outside the reach of regulators.”).
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reborrowing and effectively protect particularly vulnerable borrowers.62
C.

Lack of Consumer Understanding

There is mixed data and sentiment with respect to borrowers’
understanding of their rights and obligations when taking out payday
loans.63 Critics of payday lending suggest there is a tremendous lack of
understanding among borrowers caused by numerous factors, some of
which are attributable to payday lenders and others not.64 Due to this
alleged gap in knowledge, borrowers infrequently appreciate the
commitment they are entering into when taking out payday loans.65 For
example, borrowers tend to incorrectly believe they will not need to roll
over their loan.66 Unfortunately, borrowers often underestimate the
length of time their indebtedness will last.67 In a 2012 study where
borrowers were interviewed at curbside after taking out a payday loan,
borrowers consistently misunderstood how the loans were structured.68
Several borrowers were unaware that paying the minimum fees did not
reduce the principal.69 Furthermore, few respondents could recite the
APR on their loans70 and borrowers had difficulty stating the dollar cost
of their loans over time.71
In contrast, other studies suggest that payday lenders provide

62. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,931–32 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (arguing
that state regulatory frameworks have “still left many consumers vulnerable to the specific
harms . . . relating to reborrowing, default, and collateral harms from making unaffordable
payments”).
63. Dennis Shaul, CFPB Payday Loan Rule Ignores Existing Research, LAW360 (Sept.
22, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/842022/opinion-cfpb-payday-loan-rule-ignoresexisting-research.
64. Factors leading to a lack of understanding among borrowers include misleading
marketing on how payday loans work, borrowers’ perception that no alternative exists,
financial distress leading to a lack of searching for alternative options. Payday, Vehicle
Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 47,928.
65. See Ronald Mann, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 881–82 (2007) (“[A]
person with normal experiences, normal time constraints, and normal intelligence does not
easily evaluate the risks and rewards of a payday lending transaction.”).
66. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,928.
67. Id.
68. Martin, supra note 33, at 599–600.
69. Martin, supra note 33, at 600.
70. Martin, supra note 33, at 600.
71. Martin, supra note 33, at 600.
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sufficient information for borrowers to make informed decisions.72 A
2016 survey conducted by the Global Strategy Group and the Tarrance
Group found that as many as 96% of payday loan borrowers said they
completely understood how long it would take to repay their payday
loan and the fees they would incur.73 That same survey also suggests
that over 90% of borrowers said the lender “clearly explained” both the
terms of the loan and the consequences of not repaying the loan on
time.74
III. THE PROPOSED RULE
The Proposal is one of the most divisive in the history of the
CFPB. This Part describes what types of loans are covered under the
Proposal.76 Then, it outlines the ability-to-repay (“ATR”) test and what
it is designed to address.77 This Part ends by explaining the
circumstances in which the Proposal exempts lenders from conducting
an ATR test and other reporting requirements under the Proposal.78
75

A.

Loans Covered Under the Proposal

The Proposal applies to two types of loans (“Covered Loans”).79
The first type of Covered Loans are those with terms of over forty-five
days, including loans where vehicle title is taken as collateral.80 This
Note focuses on the second type of Covered Loans: those with terms of
forty-five days or less, including typical fourteen-day and thirty-day
payday loans.81
72. GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., BORROWER AND VOTER VIEWS OF
PAYDAY LOANS 18 (2016), http://www.tarrance.com/docs/CFSA-BorrowerandVoterSurveyAnalysisF03.03.16.pdf.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id.
75. See As the Comment Period Comes to a Close, Legislators Diverge on Payday
Lending, PYMNTS (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financialservices/2016/as-the-comment-period-comes-to-a-close-legislators-diverge-on-paydaylending/.
76. See infra Part III.A.
77. See infra Part III.B.
78. See infra Part III.C.
79. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,911 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
80. Id. at 47,912.
81. Id. at 47,869. The Proposal does not apply to (1) purchase money security interest
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The Ability-to-Repay Test

The Proposal declares it an “abusive and unfair practice” for a
lender to make a covered loan without reasonably determining that the
borrower can repay the loan while also paying for certain living
expenses.82 The Proposal requires a lender to conduct an ATR test prior
to making a covered loan.83 In conducting an ATR test, a lender must
make a reasonable determination that the potential borrower would be
able to repay the loan on time while also meeting his other “major
financial obligations” and “basic living expenses.”84 A lender must
determine that the borrower will be able to cover his basic living
expenses without needing to extend the loan or take out another loan
within the thirty days following the initial payday loan.85 The lender
must conduct an ATR test using the borrower’s income, any other
outstanding debt obligations, and living expenses.86
In conducting an ATR test, a lender must: (1) verify the
consumer’s net income; (2) verify the consumer’s debt obligations using
two different consumer reporting systems; (3) verify the consumer’s
housing costs or use a reliable method of estimating a consumer’s
housing expense; (4) forecast a reasonable amount of basic living
expenses necessary for a consumer to maintain the consumer’s health,
welfare, and ability to produce income; (5) project the consumer’s net
income, debt obligations, and housing costs for a period of time based
on the term of the loan; and (6) determine the consumer’s ability to
repay the loan based on the lender’s projections of the consumer’s
income, debt obligations, and housing costs and forecast of basic living
expenses for the consumer.87
One of the Proposal’s priorities is to combat the debt cycle

loans extended solely to finance the purchase of a car or other consumer good where the
good secures the loan; (2) home mortgages and other loans secured by real property; (3)
credit cards; (4) student loans; (5) non-recourse pawn loans; and (6) overdraft services and
lines of credit. Id. at 47,917. Although these products have the potential to lead to harmful
consequences similar to those of payday lending, these types of loans arise in distinct
markets that the CFPB believes may pose a different set of concerns for borrowers. Id.
82. Id. at 47,864–65.
83. Id. at 47,865.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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borrowers often fall into.88 The CFPB refers to this debt cycle as
“sustained use,”89 which is the long-term or repeated use of short-term,
high-cost products.90 This may become harmful when borrowers utilize
these products to cover continuous cash flow shortages,91 forcing
borrowers to incur fees that eventually exceed the principal.92 A pattern
of sustained use may indicate that a borrower is unable to repay the
principal while also meeting his other basic living expenses.93 The ATR
test aims to ensure that borrowers, when taking out payday loans, can
repay loans on time while covering these necessities.94
Studies and surveys shed light on sustained use and the debt trap
into which borrowers often fall into.95 A 2013 CFPB study surveying a
twelve-month period found that the median number of transactions per
payday borrower was ten, and borrowers were indebted for a median of
199 days.96 A 2009 survey conducted by the CRL found that as little as
2% of payday loan volume stems from non-repeat borrowers, and over
80% of payday borrowers take out multiple payday loans per year.97
Further, a 2004 study conducted by the CRL found that payday lenders
make 91% of payday loans to borrowers who take out at least five loans
per year.98
The ATR test, by ensuring that borrowers will be better able to

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 4.
Id.
Id.; see also id. at 43 (noting that a “sizeable” share of borrowers conduct many
short-term transactions over a long period of time).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 24.
94. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,936 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (addressing
how the ATR test can help avoid many injuries borrowers face, one of which is the inability
to cover basic living expenses while repaying the loan on time).
95. Martin, supra note 33, at 573.
96. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 23.
97. LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PHANTOM
DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS,
ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 2–3 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/
payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-demand-final.pdf; see also Martin, supra note
33, at 573 (noting how empirical studies report that repeat customers comprise “the vast
majority” of all payday lending customers).
98. KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRIS & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 7 (2004), http://
www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/
CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf.
88.
89.
90.
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repay their loans on time, theoretically eliminates, or at least curbs, the
predatory debt collection practices payday lenders or third-party debt
collectors often employ.99 Collection activities include calls, letters, and
visits to borrowers’ homes and workplaces.100 Many payday lenders
pursue judicial action as well.101 Moreover, some lenders turn to illegal
debt collection practices, such as false threats to add new fees, deceptive
messages to induce borrowers to return calls, and fallacious referrals to
a non-existent in-house collections department.102 These practices can
cause psychological distress and anxiety in borrowers who are already
under financial pressure.103 The Proposal addresses these exploitative
techniques through the ATR test, which would reduce borrowers rolling
over loans, reduce default rates, and thus, reduce the need for lenders to
collect.104
C.

Principal Payoff Option for Certain Short-Term Loans

The principal payoff option allows a lender, without conducting
an ATR test, to make a covered loan up to $500 if the loan does not
include a security interest in a vehicle.105 The principal payoff option is
designed for lower-risk lending situations.106 The lender may extend
the loan twice, but only if the principal is reduced by one-third each
time.107 However, a lender may not make a covered loan if it would
result in the borrower either having more than six outstanding covered

99. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,874 (outlining various collection methods lenders employ upon default).
100. CFPB COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 2015-2017, IN-PERSON COLLECTION OF CONSUMER
DEBT, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 16, 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201512_cfpb_compliance-bulletin-in-person-collection-of-consumer-debt.pdf.
101. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,874 (“A study of small claims court cases filed in Utah from 2005 to 2010 found that
38% of cases were attributable to payday loans.”).
102. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 17–19 (Spring 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201405_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-spring-2014.pdf.
103. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,930.
104. See id. at 47,865 (describing the primary and secondary impacts of the ATR test).
105. Id.
106. CFPB Fact Sheet: Payday Debt Traps (Payday, auto-title, and similar credit),
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE CREDIT UNION SUPERVISORS (2016), http://nascus.org/regulatoryresources/CFPB%20Fact%20Sheet%20Payday%20Debt%20Traps%206-28-16.php.
107. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47,930.
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loans during a consecutive twelve-month period or being in debt for
more than ninety days during that same period.108
The principal payoff option includes a number of screening and
structural protections for consumers receiving loans not covered under
the Proposal.109 These protections reduce the likelihood and magnitude
of consumer harm from defaulting on and extending payday loans.110
The exception would allow a consumer with occasional shortfalls in
income to receive a limited number of covered loans.111
D.

Registered Information Systems and Monitoring

The Proposal also requires lenders to disseminate basic
information for covered loans to registered information systems
regarding origination, any updates to that information over the life of
the loan, and certain information when the borrower repays the loan in
full.112 According to the CFPB, the registered information systems
would provide a “reasonably comprehensive record” of a borrower’s
recent and current borrowing.113 Over time, this registered information
system will alleviate some of the burden on the lender in determining
whether a consumer passes the ATR test.114
Lenders are also required to establish and follow a compliance
program and retain certain additional records.115 Lenders must also
develop and follow certain written policies designed to ensure
compliance with the Proposal.116 Lenders would be responsible for
retaining the loan agreement, documentation obtained for a covered
loan, and electronic records including origination calculations and
determinations for a covered loan for a borrower who passes the ATR
test.117

108. Id.
109. Id. at 47,969.
110. Id. at 47,865.
111. Id. at 47,970.
112. Id. at 47,866.
113. Id.
114. See id. (discussing how registered information systems “would provide a

reasonably comprehensive record” of a consumer’s borrowing habits).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED RULE
This Part analyzes the Proposal and critiques it in light of its
goals. First, Section A outlines concerns over the breadth of the
Proposal and the potential for reduced access to credit, as well as
available alternatives to payday loans.118 Second, Section B describes
mixed consumer sentiment towards payday lending and whether
consumers truly desire payday lending reform.119
A.

Breadth of the Proposal and Reduced Consumer Access to
Credit

Payday lenders furnish a valuable service by providing credit,
and therefore short-term relief, to borrowers often in their most
desperate time of need.120 Borrowers who do not qualify for other
credit products praise the availability of payday loans,121 and often
report having no alternative source of credit when taking out a payday
loan.122 One survey suggests over nine in ten borrowers agree that
payday loans can be a sensible decision for consumers who are faced
with unexpected expenses.123
Payday lenders fear that the “extremely complex and
prescriptive nature” of the voluminous 1,300-page Proposal will
regulate them out of the market.124 Consumers will face reduced access
to credit if droves of payday lenders exit the marketplace.125 The CFPB
is sensitive to these concerns and recognizes the need for emergency

118. See infra Part IV.A.
119. See infra Part IV.B.
120. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LOANS PUT FAMILIES IN THE RED (2009),

http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/payday-puts-familiesin-the-red-final.pdf.
121. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 3.
122. GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 18 (noting that almost
75% of borrowers who took out a payday had no alternative access to credit).
123. GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 17.
124. Comment Letter from Camden Fine, Pres. & CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am.,
& Jim Nussle, Pres. & CEO, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n, to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau (June 27, 2016), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/
5/2016/06/ICBA-Letter.pdf.
125. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Examines Payday Lending (Jan.
19, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-examines-payday-lending/; Fine & Nussle, supra note 124.
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credit,126 but if the Proposal is adopted, many lenders, including
community banks and credit unions, may eliminate existing products or
refrain from developing new borrower-friendly, short-term loan
options.127
The Proposal will impact different lenders in different ways.
For example, community banks and other smaller lenders operate
differently from larger institutions.128 Most community banks are
locally owned and have strong ties to their surrounding communities.129
Regulatory compliance requirements will impose a disproportionate
burden on community banks and smaller lenders relative to larger
institutions, which have dedicated legal resources, larger compliance
staffs, and can shift the costs of compliance across a larger number of
loans.130 A heavier compliance burden places smaller lenders at a
competitive disadvantage and may lead to reduced consumer access to
credit if these lenders, as a response to being disadvantaged, exit the
marketplace.131
Reduced access to credit as a result of the Proposal may cause
consumers to borrow from alternative sources less beneficial than
payday loans, including offshore payday lenders, whom the CFPB has
already targeted.132 Supporters of payday lending argue that a payday
loan may be better than no credit at all.133 However, opponents of
payday lending contend that the risk of borrowers turning to less
reputable or beneficial providers of credit is insufficient to justify
allowing current practices in the payday lending industry to continue.134
Weakening the argument of the payday lending community is
that there are numerous alternatives for borrowers even if the Proposal
126. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,920 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
127. Fine & Nussle, supra note 124.
128. See Comment Letter from Viveca Ware, Exec. Vice Pres. Reg. Pol’y, Indep. Cmty.
Bankers of Am., to David Silberman, Assoc. Dir. for Research, Markets, and Regulations,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 8 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CFPB-2016-0025-0033 (discussing how the Proposal impacts lenders with
different operations).
129. Id. at 1.
130. Id. at 8.
131. Id.
132. Mann, supra note 65, at 886.
133. Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 607, 610 (2012).
134. Mann, supra note 65, at 887–88.
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regulates some lenders out of the marketplace.135 For example, credit
card cash advances are less expensive than payday loans, typically
offering an APR of 30%.136 Small consumer-finance companies offer
small short-term loans with a cost up to 60% APR, but are usually in the
range of 25 to 36%.137 These loans allow a consumer to borrow $1000
for a year at an overall lower cost than a $300 payday loan over the
same period.138 Many employers advance paychecks—a process which
has no interest at all139—where an employee repays the advance out of
his next paycheck.140 Additionally, banks could fill any gap in
consumer access to credit the Proposal leaves behind.141
Notwithstanding the availability of numerous lower cost alternatives to
payday loans, one issue remains: scores of borrowers simply do not
qualify or choose not to utilize these alternative products, adding
strength to payday lenders’ arguments with respect to the Proposal’s
potentially devastating impact on reduced consumer access to credit.142
B.

Consumer Satisfaction with the Payday Lending Industry

Studies reveal mixed attitudes among consumers with respect to
the payday lending industry.143 The CFPB gathered the information

135. Hayes, supra note 25, at 1158 (noting how banks and credit unions provide lower
cost alternatives to payday loans). But see Hayes, supra note 25, at 1158 (“[B]anks and
credit unions have traditionally shied away from payday lending.”).
136. Alternatives to Payday Loans, PINE TREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE (Sept. 2014), http://
ptla.org/alternatives-payday-loans.
137. Brendan Case, With Payday Loans, Poor Get the Loans, Firms Get the Payday,
DALLAS NEWS: MONEY (July 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/money/2010/07/
26/with-payday-loans-poor-get-the-loans-firms-get-the-payday.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Dana Dratch, How Employee Salary Advances Work (Jul. 17, 2013), http://
www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/employee-salary-pay-advance-1273.php.
141. Hayes, supra note 25, at 1158.
142. See Martin, supra note 33, at 618–19 (claiming borrowers do not use alternatives to
payday loans out of embarrassment).
143. E.g., U. OF N.C. CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, NORTH CAROLINA CONSUMER AFTER
PAYDAY LENDING: ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES WITH CREDIT OPTIONS 12 (2007), http://
www.nccob.gov/public/docs/News/Press%20Releases/Archives/2007/
NC_After_Payday.pdf (finding “stark” differences in attitudes towards payday lending).
Some payday loan users praise the speed at which they could acquire money, yet others feel
payday lenders take advantage of desperate borrowers. Id. Borrowers highlighted the
benefit of using payday loans for “extra money between paychecks,” yet others reported
they took out a payday loan and eventually “go[t] into more debt.” Id.
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underlying the Proposal from numerous sources, including consumer
complaints.144 As of January 1, 2016, the CFPB had received
approximately 36,200 consumer complaints relating to payday loans.145
Specific complaints include payday lenders’ behavior causing
psychological and emotional distress due to numerous phone calls,
threats of legal action, and repeated contacts with borrowers’ family
members and employers.146 Additional complaints include payday
lenders initiating payments before the due date on loans and triggering
bank fees by attempting to withdraw more than the scheduled
amount.147
Despite the list of borrowers’ complaints, it is unclear whether
consumer sentiment is as opposed to payday lending practices as the
CFPB suggests.148 In July 2011, the CFPB launched a complaint portal
where consumers could voice their frustrations about financial firms.149
After filing a Freedom of Information Act request, the Community
Financial Services Association of America (“CFSA”), a trade
association representing the short-term lending industry, claimed that
12,308 of the 12,546 comments submitted “praised the industry . . . or
otherwise indicated positive experiences.”150 The CFSA argues that
more than 98% of comments submitted on short-term loans praised the
industry for its products and services.151 Further, the CFSA claimed the
“vast majority” of the 238 comments indicating negative experiences
were either mistakenly categorized as payday lending comments or
related to scams and unregulated lenders that the Proposal fails to
address.152
The discrepancy between the apparent high level of satisfaction
144. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,867 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
145. Id. at 47,898.
146. Id. at 47,991.
147. Id. at 48,050.
148. See GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 29 (suggesting that
borrowers are generally supportive of payday lending).
149. Yuka Hayashi, Consumers With Complaints Flock to CFPB, WALL ST. J. (July 25,
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-complaints-center-generates-results-andcontroversy-1469439003?mg=id-wsj.
150. CFPB Buried, Ignored Positive Payday Loan Customer “Tell Your Story”
Testimonials it Requested, CMTY. FIN. SERV. ASS’N OF AM. (Sept. 6, 2016), http://cfsaa.com/
our-resources/communications/recent-news/article-detail/newsid/131.aspx.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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among borrowers and the state of affairs suggested in the Proposal has
led some to question whether consumers truly desire more strict
regulation of payday loans.153 Perhaps the high rate of borrower
satisfaction in some surveys suggests that most payday lenders provide
quality service, and only a few payday lenders are causing the harmful
results that the Proposal seeks to eliminate.154
V. INCENTIVIZING BANKS TO ENTER THE MARKETPLACE
Banks entering the payday/high-risk short-term
loan
marketplace could mitigate concerns over the Proposal reducing
consumer access to credit. Additionally, banks could potentially replace
payday lenders altogether, reducing instances of aggressive, harmful
debt collection practices and other predatory lending activities often
associated with payday lenders. As it stands now, the Proposal does
little to incentivize banks to enter the marketplace.
Part V suggests modifications to the Proposal that will
incentivize banks to enter the payday lending marketplace and also calls
for federal regulators to encourage and provide support to banks willing
to provide short-term credit products to consumers. Section A discusses
why banks are in a good position to extend payday loans.155 Next,
Section B explains why banks are hesitant to enter the marketplace and
suggests that these concerns may be unjustified.156 Section C then
demonstrates how increasing the number of safe harbors that would
permit institutions to avoid conducting ATR tests reduces banks’
concerns and encourages banks to enter the marketplace, using one safe
harbor based off of the Qualified Mortgage principal in Sections 1411
and 1412 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) as a model.157

Id.
See GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 6 (“The vast
majority of borrowers say the lender clearly explained the terms of the loan . . . .
[B]orrowers say . . . that payday lenders are flexible when working with borrowers who
experience payment difficulties.”).
155. See infra Part V.A.
156. See infra Part V.B.
157. See infra Part V.C; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §§ 1411–12, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2012) (listing the
requirements of a qualified mortgage).
153.
154.
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Banks are Well-Positioned to Make Payday Loans

Banks can recapture the entire payday lending marketplace if
they offer alternative products and services with better terms than
payday loans.158 Generally, banks can offer a different mix of products
to low-income borrowers and already have an established infrastructure
and staff.159 Banks can spread the risk of loss over all their products160
and do not have to rely exclusively on payday loan revenues to
operate.161 In addition, banks have greater access to capital to finance
loans.162 Whether or not the Proposal is finalized, by competing with
payday lenders at lower prices, banks could force payday lenders to
adopt better terms or potentially exit the marketplace.163
Banks possess a number of tools to compete with payday
lenders.164 One such tool is overdraft protection charges.165 Banks can
structure overdraft charges in a way that allows borrowers to repay such
charges easily, similar to a payment plan.166 Products could provide a
borrower multiple pay periods through which they can accumulate
sufficient funds to repay the loan or allow a borrower to repay the loan
through installments over a few weeks or months.167 Unlike payday
lenders, banks could choose to allow partial payments, and borrowers
would be able to build credit because banks could report those payments
to credit agencies.168 Banks may be able to undercut payday lenders

158. Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank
Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 150 (2005).
159. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 708. But see id. (“But to become a convenient option,
banks may need to open more locations and potentially keep longer hours.”).
160. SHEILA BAIR, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES
AND
OBSTACLES
3
(2005),
https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/101/
FEs3622H334.pdf?sequence=1.
161. Kelly Noyes, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627, 1675 (2006).
162. Id. at 1674.
163. See Bertics, supra note 158, at 149–50 (arguing that customers would likely deal
with minor inconveniences, such as traveling longer distances and dealing with less
extensive hours, to take advantage of lower rates and better terms offered by banks, which
would allow banks to gain access to a larger customer base).
164. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 700.
165. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 700.
166. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 700.
167. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 709.
168. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 709.
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through limits on APRs.169 Finally, even if banks could not offer lower
fees per loan, banks could still meet structural standards for loans that
payday lenders could not, providing borrowers with increased
flexibility.170
B.

Banks are Hesitant to Enter the Marketplace

Although banks are well-positioned to make payday loans,
many are hesitant to, or simply do not, make payday loans for numerous
reasons.171 Three common reasons for banks’ hesitancy to enter the
payday lending marketplace include reputational concerns, the
profitability of payday loans, and regulatory animosity toward federally
regulated banks offering payday loans.
A bank’s reputation is undeniably important,172 and banks are
concerned with the reputational risk associated with payday lending.173
Companies and firms find it profitable to develop a reputation for
honesty and integrity,174 and making payday loans may tarnish a bank’s
image in the community.175 While the emphasis on maintaining a
positive reputation is well-founded, the reputational risk of payday
lending may not be as prevalent if there is an effective regulation
scheme governing the practice.176 Jonathan Macey, in an article on the
reputational model in capital markets, argues the following:
[T]he value to financial institutions of investing in
reputation declines to the extent that a regulatory system
that people believe is effective is put into place. This is
because reputation and regulation, both of which serve

169.
170.
171.
172.

Kenneth, supra note 19, at 708.
Kenneth, supra note 19, at 709.
BAIR, supra note 160, at 9.
E.g., Woodward v. Raymond James Fin., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y.

2010).
173. Michelle Leder, How the Other Half Banks: The Depressing, Amazing “Payday
Loan” Business, SLATE (May 10, 2004), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/
2004/05/how_the_other_half_banks.html.
174. Jonathan Macey, The Demise of the Reputational Model in Capital Markets: The
Problem of the “Last Period Parasites”, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 427, 430–31 (2010).
175. BAIR, supra note 160, at 9.
176. See Macey, supra note 174, at 445 (arguing that reputation and an effective
regulation scheme are direct substitutes).
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the role of providing contracting parties with some
reassurance that they won’t be cheated or taken
advantage of in the course of financial dealings, are
substitutes for one another.177
Using Macey’s theory, a Proposal that adequately regulates
payday lending could theoretically ease one of banks’ primary concerns
by eliminating, or at least drastically reducing, the potential reputational
harm payday lending poses to banks.
Even if the Proposal is not adopted and there is no regulation
scheme to substitute for reputation, banks can still protect their
reputations if they enter the marketplace. Much of the animosity toward
payday lending stems from the allegedly abusive behavior of payday
lenders.178 Thus, banks can mitigate the risk of reputational harm by
responsibly providing products similar to payday loans without
engaging in abusive practices. Further, banks have economic incentives
to avoid engaging in reputation-harming practices, such as aggressive
debt collection and predatory lending.179 Developing a positive
reputation is costly and time-consuming, and harming one’s reputation
results in losing business and increased transaction costs.180 If more
banks enter the payday lending marketplace and transform the market
into a competitive one, banks will be motivated to achieve profitability
and the value of their companies will increase by developing and
maintaining a positive reputation.181
A second chief concern of banks revolves around the higher
risks of payday lending, which involves risky products requiring high
interest rates in order to maintain profitability.182 Banks are concerned
with the profitability of payday lending even in the absence of the
Proposal,183 and the Proposal only further increases the costs and
Macey, supra note 174, at 445.
See Shih, supra note 51, at 40 (arguing that opponents of payday lending focus not
on the actual products, but on consumers who are “fooled into credit arrangements they
cannot understand”).
179. Macey, supra note 174, at 447–48.
180. Macey, supra note 174, at 448.
181. See Bryson Kern, Reputational Injury Without a Reputational Attack: Addressing
Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 256 (2014)
(outlining how damaging a firm’s reputation places the firm’s economic security at risk).
182. BAIR, supra note 160, at 9.
183. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 694.
177.
178.
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threatens the profitability of payday lending.184 In response to these
concerns, the CFPB argues that it has designed the ATR test
requirement to minimize significant and unnecessary costs.185
Specifically, the CFPB believes that the ATR test will significantly
offset compliance costs because the ATR test will reduce the rate of
default, and as a result, reduce expenses associated with defaulting
borrowers.186
Reducing costs of compliance with the Proposal addresses one
of banks’ primary concerns: maintaining profitability with a risky
product like payday lending. To reduce compliance costs, the payday
lending industry is advocating for, among other things, increased
flexibility in reporting requirements.187 As the Proposal currently
stands, lenders must meet the same reporting and verification
requirements for each borrower.188 Flexible reporting requirements
would enable banks to meet the specific needs of individual
borrowers.189 Since there are a multitude of methods for conducting an
ATR test, flexible reporting and verification requirements would enable
banks to find the most cost effective and time efficient methods to
ensure compliance with the Proposal.190 However, the CFPB argues
that the Proposal already provides for sufficient flexibility; for example,
the Proposal aims to provide “substantial flexibility” for the type of
evidence lenders can use for verification of income and expenses.191
Specifically, lenders may use housing estimates instead of obtaining
verification evidence.192 Additionally, the Proposal does not require
184. See MAYER BROWN LLP, THE CFPB’S PAYDAY PROPOSAL: BRODER THAN ONE
MAY THINK (June 24, 2016), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/117ad022b536-42f6-89c7-38a8863180aa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/40e512d9-872d-4a799cdd-430ce6c6f948/160624-UPDATE-CFS.pdf (outlining the various measures payday
lenders must take in complying with the proposal).
185. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 48,001 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
186. Id.
187. See Ware, supra note 128, at 9 (discussing how the Proposal impacts lenders with
different operations).
188. Ware, supra note 128, at 9.
189. Ware, supra note 128, at 10.
190. Ware, supra note 128, at 1 (knowing a borrower’s history and general ability to
repay loans gives a lender inside information that other lenders may not possess about their
customers).
191. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 48,001 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
192. Id.
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actual verification of basic living expenses.193 While this flexibility is a
step in the right direction, it is clearly insufficient to eliminate banks’
concerns over maintaining profitability.194
Banks have successfully implemented products similar to
payday loans, which may suggest that banks’ fear over profitability may
be unreasonably high. In 2005, Austin Bank of Chicago first offered
Ready Cash Now, a fixed loan ranging from $300 to $999.99 with an
APR of almost 12%.195 The loan is repaid over twelve months through
automatic deductions from the borrower’s deposit account.196 The use
of lines of credit similar to the one offered by Austin Bank of Chicago
decreases servicing costs because banks do not need to assign
employees to help borrowers renew loans every two weeks like payday
lenders do with roll-over transactions.197
La Salle Bank in Chicago developed a small loan product only
available for emergency situations.198 The amount of the loan cannot
exceed $1,000, has an APR of 12%, and a maximum term of twelve
months.199 LaSalle has since been purchased by Bank of America,200
and the fate of its short-term loan program is unknown. Both the
LaSalle Bank and Austin Bank of Chicago products had built in
protections to deter risky lending, including verifying a borrower’s
employment history, limiting the maximum debt-to-income ratio
allowed, and prohibiting the extension of loans to borrowers currently in
bankruptcy.201
Citibank’s Checking Plus is a revolving line of credit linked to a
borrower’s bank account.202 The interest rate is 17%, with the balance
repaid in monthly installments through automatic deductions.203 The
default repayment schedule is 1/60th of the outstanding balance, and

Id.
See Ware, supra note 128, at 9 (expressing concern over the cost of compliance).
BAIR, supra note 160, at 25.
BAIR, supra note 160, at 25.
Bertics, supra note 158, at 153–54.
BAIR, supra note 160, at 25.
BAIR, supra note 160, at 25.
Bank of America Completes Purchase of LaSalle Bank, BANK OF AM., http://
investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1057174#fbid=ovw64mXj0tR (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
201. BAIR, supra note 160, at 25–26.
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borrowers can prepay the balances or request a different default
repayment schedule.204
The North Carolina State Employees’ Credit Union
(“NCSECU”), in 2001, created the salary-advance loan (“SALO”), a
revolving loan with a maximum amount of $500 with an interest rate of
12% that is due on the borrower’s next payday.205 To obtain a SALO, a
borrower must place 5% of each advance in a savings account in order
to help prevent future borrowing.206 The SALO program was
successful, and the mandatory savings requirement generated $10
million in new deposit funds.207 NCSECU members rely heavily on
SALO loans, suggesting that the product has replaced payday loans in
the area.208 In general, with more incentives and encouragement from
federal agencies and regulators, banks are more likely to develop similar
products to those outlined above and replace payday lenders, eliminate
predatory lending, and provide at-risk borrowers with access to safer
alternatives.209
A final concern of banks is the perceived regulatory animosity
toward partnerships between federally regulated banks and payday
lenders.210 According to the payday lending industry, banks are ending
relationships with payday lenders or ceasing to offer certain short-term
loan products as a result of increased pressure from agencies such as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and the Federal Reserve.211 For
example, in 2014, Wells Fargo & Co., U.S. Bancorp, and Fifth Third
Bancorp, due to regulatory pressure, stopped providing short-term
products designed as alternatives to payday loans.212
BAIR, supra note 160, at 27.
BAIR, supra note 160, at 53.
BAIR, supra note 160, at 53.
Noyes, supra note 161, at 1677.
Noyes, supra note 161, at 1677.
See Adam Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26
YALE J. ON REG. 143, 147 (2009) (noting how proper incentives can provide banks with
“stronger incentives to engage in careful and prudent underwriting and to avoid abusive
terms likely to trigger defaults and make consumer debt more volatile”).
210. Id.
211. Annamaria Andriotis & Telis Demos, Federal Bank Watchdogs Say They’re Not
Forcing Banks from Payday, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/
2016/12/08/federal-bank-watchdogs-say-theyre-not-forcing-banks-from-payday/?mg=idwsj.
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Regulatory scrutiny may no longer be a significant concern in
the Trump administration, as President Trump will likely seek
widespread cuts in regulations across the banking industry.213
Specifically, Trump is targeting both the CFPB and the Proposal,214 On
January 30, 2017, Trump signed an executive order requiring federal
agencies to cut two existing regulations for every new regulation
implemented, and also stated that his administration aims to cut
regulations “massively” for large and small businesses.215 On February
3, 2017, Trump signed a memorandum ordering a review of DoddFrank with the aim of “cutting a lot out” of those rules.216
Congressional Republicans have several means of stopping the Proposal
from ever being finalized.217 Republicans could disapprove the
Proposal through the Congressional Review Act, or if CFPB Director
Cordray steps down, a Trump appointee could simply refuse to finalize
the Proposal.218 However, even if the Proposal is not finalized, banks
could still enter the marketplace and service this important consumer
need at a lower cost than payday lenders.219
C.

Expanding the Safe Harbors Available Under the Proposal

The Proposal contains one safe harbor that permits entities to
avoid conducting ATR tests: the principal payoff option.220 The CFPB
Regulatory Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303465004579326353453941082?mg=id-wsj.
213. Michael Corkery, Trump Expected to Seek Deep Cuts in Business Regulations, NY
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/business/dealbook/
trump-expected-to-seek-deep-cuts-in-business-regulations.html?_r=0.
214. Lucinda Shen, Donald Trump is Targeting an Agency That Has Recovered $11.8
Billion for Consumers, FORTUNE: FINANCE (Jan. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/27/
donald-trump-cfpb-consumer-protection-financial-bureau-elizabeth-warren/.
215. Bourree Lam, Trump’s ‘Two-for-One’ Regulation Executive Order, ATLANTIC (Jan.
30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/trumps-regulation-eo/
515007/.
216. Telis Demos & Peter Rudegeair, The $100 Billion Reason Investors Loved Trump’s
Bank Order, WALL ST. J (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-100-billionreason-investors-loved-trumps-bank-order-1486321893.
217. Joseph Lawler, Trump May Be a Boon for Payday Lenders, WASH. EXAMINER
(Nov. 20, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-presidency-maybe-a-boon-for-payday-lenders/article/2607815.
218. Id.
219. Noyes, supra note 161, at 1674–75.
220. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,863, 47,970 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
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argues that not requiring lenders to conduct ATR tests for loans under
the principal payoff option will reduce much of the costs of
compliance.221 However, the CFPB also claims that a “substantial
fraction of loans currently made would not qualify for the
exemption.”222 Significantly reducing compliance costs while
exempting only a minimal number of loans under the principal payoff
option are incongruous goals. Additional safe harbors are needed to
adequately reduce compliance costs and incentivize banks to enter the
marketplace. However, consumer advocates argue that creating
additional safe harbors for conducting ATR tests weakens the overall
rule framework.223
Expanding on the exemptions for conducting ATR tests would
enable banks to offer products similar to payday loans without incurring
the costs of complying with the Proposal. This would directly address
banks’ concerns over the profitability of payday lending. One safe
harbor for payday loans could be designed using the existing
qualifications the CFPB provides for Qualified Mortgages (“QM”)
under Dodd-Frank.224 Dodd-Frank permits a lender to extend a QM
without conducting an ATR test, as borrowers of a QM are presumed to
have the ability to repay the loan.225 In general, a QM is a mortgage
where: (1) points and fees are less than or equal to 3% of the principal;
(2) there are no risky features such as negative amortization, interestonly, or balloon loans; and (3) the maximum loan term is less than or
equal to thirty years.226
On the other hand, if a mortgage does not qualify as a QM,
Dodd-Frank requires lenders to make a reasonable, good faith
determination that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the
loan.227 A lender must consider eight factors when conducting an

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1412, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2015) (listing the requirements of a qualified mortgage).
225. Id.
226. Dodd-Frank § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2); Basic Guide for Lenders: What is a
Qualified Mortgage?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201310_cfpb_qm-guide-for-lenders.pdf, (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).
227. CONSUMER FIN PROT. BUREAU, ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE
RULE: SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE 17–18 (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
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ability-to-repay test for a non-QM under Dodd-Frank: (1) current or
reasonably expected income or assets the consumer will rely upon to
repay the loan; (2) current employment status; (3) monthly mortgage
payment for the loan; (4) monthly payment on any simultaneous loans
secured by the same property; (5) monthly payment for property taxes
and insurance the lender requires the consumer to buy; (6) debts,
alimony, and child-support obligations; (7) monthly debt-to-income
ratio or residual income; and (8) credit history.228 The rule provides a
private right of action, allowing borrowers to seek actual damages,
statutory damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and special damages equal to
the finance charges and fees incurred.229
Both QM and the Proposal have similar goals: curbing predatory
lending practices and protecting consumers.230 QM incentivizes lenders
to extend safer mortgages, primarily less risky ones, by permitting
lenders to avoid conducting ATR tests and other regulations.231 QM
reduces the likelihood that a lender would extend a mortgage where the
borrower lacks the ability to repay a mortgage with predatory
characteristics.232
The Independent Community Bankers of America (“ICBA”)
suggest utilizing a safe harbor provision that focuses on the lender, in
contrast to the principal payoff option, which focuses on the borrower’s
financial standing.233 This safe harbor would apply to banks whose
loans perform above a certain threshold or do not possess risky and
predatory lending characteristics.234 This modification encourages
banks to act responsibly by providing an opportunity to issue payday
loans without conducting an ATR test.235 The safe harbor proposed by
Id.
Sanford Shatz, An Overview of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s
Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/blt/2013/04/02_shatz.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
230. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
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Olvera, Why the CFPB Should Reconsider Dodd-Frank’s Prohibition on Yield Spread
Premiums, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 323, 347 (2012).
231. Davis Reiss, Message in a Mortgage: What Dodd-Frank’s “Qualified Mortgage”
Tells Us About Ourselves, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 717, 721 (2012).
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the ICBA incentivizes banks to enter the marketplace by allowing banks
to avoid compliance costs, thus reducing concerns over profitability.236
As a matter of basic policy, responsible lenders should be subject to a
lesser standard that recognizes their history of responsible lending
practices and emphasis on greater consumer protection.237 The CFPB
should be encouraging borrowers to transact with responsible lenders,
rather than broadly imposing burdens on all lenders who provide
payday loans.238
The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) advocates
for exempting lenders from being required to conduct ATR tests for
loans where the total payment owed does not exceed 5% of the
borrower’s gross monthly income.239 This threshold arguably satisfies
the goals of the ATR test in a less complex manner.240 Exempting loans
with less than a 5% debt-to-income ratio reduces compliance and
overall transactional costs in two ways: (1) lenders avoid conducting
ATR tests and (2) borrowers are less likely to default on or rollover
loans with a low debt-to-income ratio, thereby reducing default-related
expenditures.241 Additionally, loans extended at a low debt-to-income
ratio are not the primary target of the Proposal,242 since borrowers are
more likely to be able to repay these loans while also covering basic
living expenses, which is what the Proposal aims to achieve.243 This
safe harbor increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the Proposal in
curbing risky loans, while also encouraging banks to enter the
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marketplace by reducing banks’ fears over profitability.244
VI. CONCLUSION
The CFPB’s Proposal aims to eliminate payday lending
practices that often force borrowers into repeated, long-term use of
payday loans. While the Proposal is designed to actively address issues
surrounding repeat borrowing, sustained use, and harmful debt
collection practices, the Proposal may also significantly reduce
consumer access to credit by regulating many lenders out of the
marketplace. One potential solution to this issue is to encourage
traditional banks to enter the payday loan marketplace by reducing the
Proposal’s compliance costs. Expanding the principal payoff option by
creating additional exemptions from the ATR test requirements can
encourage these depository institutions to offer more consumer-friendly
products in this area. Creating safe harbors and maintaining adequate
degrees of consumer protection are not mutually exclusive goals.
Finally, by encouraging and supporting banks’ exploration of new
products similar to payday loans, banks will be more likely to enter the
marketplace and provide borrowers with safer access to short-term
credit, even if the Proposal does not come to fruition.
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